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now meditating WAR. — *Give us this day our daily bread.* How dare you say this to your Father in heaven at the moment you are going to burn your brother's corn-fields, and would rather lose the benefit of them yourself than suffer him to enjoy them unmolested? — *Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive those who trespass against us.* With what face can you pray thus when, so far from forgiving your brother, you are going with all the haste you can, to murder him in cold blood for an alleged trespass which, after all, is but imaginary? — *Lead us not into temptation.* And do you presume to deprecate temptation or danger — you who are not only rushing into it yourself, but doing all you can to force your brother into it? — *Deliver us from evil.* You pray to be delivered from evil, that is, from the evil being, Satan, to whose impulses you are now submitting yourself, and by whose spirit you are guided in contriving the greatest possible evil to your brother?

WAR PENSIONERS — Would seem to be a long-lived race. The war of our Revolution ended in 1783, eighty-five years ago; but pensioners were reported as alive some year ago, and now there are said to be no less than eight hundred and eighty-eight revolutionary widows still receiving pensions from our government. At this rate, in what year of our Lord are we likely to stop like pensions to the soldiers of our Rebellion, and their heirs?

STANDING ARMIES UNNECESSARY.

BY ANDREW P. PEABODY, D.D., LL.D.

Our late rebellion has taught us the uselessness of standing armies. At its outbreak we had almost none, nay, we might better have had none at all; for the officers of the army did immeasurably more service to the cause of treason than to that of the Union, while its soldiers bore an infinitesimally small proportion to those subsequently enlisted and drafted. Never was a country so entirely unprepared for war. Long peace and conscious security at the North had led to the general abandonment even of the formality of enrolment and training, and the scanty volunteer forces had been organized without the remotest reference to active service, often approaching more nearly the character of convivial clubs than that of military companies. A large portion of the arms and ammunition belonging to the country had, likewise, been antecedently stolen by the traitors.

In this condition of things, we were overtaken by the assault on Fort Sumter, and, before we could rally from the shock, by the march of what then seemed an immense rebel army northward. Yet need gave vigor. The cause created its champions. It was soon found that not only could the bone and muscle, the life and soul of the country be converted instantly into efficient force, but that arms could be supplied as fast as men; so that we had well-equipped troops in the field almost as soon as if the scattered corps of a great army had been concentrated for that purpose from distant garrisons. They went to meet enemies

who were born fighters, inured from infancy to the use of arms, who had been specially trained and furnished for this conflict by many months of the most diligent covert preparation. In the first great encounter, our troops were almost victorious, the tide of battle setting strongly in their favor for several hours, and turned against them by one of those unaccountable panics which sometimes sweep like a death-dealing blast over a people, a city, or an army. The subsequent warfare was, undoubtedly, the most difficult series of campaigns in all military history, when we consider the unprecedentedly large command often confided to a single general, the not infrequent conflict of authorities, the immense frontier to be kept in occupation, and the almost impassable barriers of marsh and mire and jungle which constantly impeded movement near the chief military centres. Yet our raw troops endured every form of hardship and suffering with less proportional loss than was ever known in an army before; nor has even a small body of men in actual service ever been kept more fully supplied with arms, ammunition, and the necessities and comforts of life than were our hundreds of thousands from the beginning to the end of the conflict. This is the first lesson of the kind that the world has had; and it can hardly fail to attract due attention in other countries, while it must necessarily lead to the gradual diminution of our remaining troops, till they shall be reduced to the standard of a mere police force.

One who has not been in Europe can hardly estimate the vampire-drain made on the vitals of a nation by a standing army. Every soldier subtracts the labor of two men from what should be the available industrial force of the nation, by his transfer from the ranks of producers to those of non-productive consumers. He creates no value; he is sustained by the values which another man creates. Then, too, on the peace-establishment, because life is idle, it is of necessity worse than idle. Gambling and licentiousness are almost inseparable from the uniform; and the mischief wrought on the general character of a community by the presence of large bodies of men with neither family ties nor adequate employment, exceeds all calculation. Worst of all, in most of the countries of Continental Europe the army is kept full by a system of conscription, or by the regular service, at a suitable age, of all able-bodied young men who cannot or will not furnish substitutes. Consequently, every such young man has a reprieve from regular industry, and a sequestration from all salutary domestic influences, at the very age when the character is in the process of formation; while many are taken from young families which require their guardianship, and which are left by the withdrawal of it, not only to want, but to the most adverse moral exposure. Nor do the habits and proclivities of post and garrison life cease when the term of service expires. They cling visibly to the mass of the common people in every country of Europe, and are witnessed in indolence and shiftlessness, in the distaste for continuous labor, in an incapacity for that close application without which there is no industrial progress, and in the imposing upon women of all the heavy burdens and onerous tasks.

I must be permitted to dwell for a moment on this last-

named feature of European life, so abhorrent from our own notions of fitness. The traveller in Europe is made to feel most painfully the toil and misery entailed upon the feebleness by the imagined necessities of the State. In some quarters, from twelve to twenty women may often be seen performing the severest field work, under the supervision of a single male overseer; in others, women bear on their heads or backs the entire harvest of the land from the field to the barn, and are so bent by the habitual carriage of heavy weights, that they never assume an erect posture, and seem as if they were suffering under that imprecation of the Psalmist, "bow down their backs always;" while others still are yoked with cattle to the plough, or with dogs to the market-cart. Without their exhausting labor, while the strongest men are in garrison and camp, the fields would remain untilled, or their products ungathered, so that for these women life is worn wearily away in the mere struggle to sustain it. Where this is the condition of society, the common arts of life — those that lighten and cheapen labor, those that adorn and gladden home, those that add comfort and refinement to the ordinary lot of toil and care, those that multiply the forms of utility and beauty which are the legitimate growth of Christian civilization — remain undeveloped, and life is as hard, rude, and mean, as it was five centuries ago.

Yet more, standing armies are among the foremost causes of war. A friend of mine, who many years ago settled as a lawyer in a region of our western country where private warfare was of every-day occurrence, related to me a most instructive chapter of his own experience. Himself eminently a man of peace, he was told, when preparing for his first attendance at the county court, that he could not safely go unarmed. He accordingly furnished himself with a bowie-knife and a brace of pistols, and took good care that they should not remain wholly hidden beneath his raiment. He found himself perpetually on the brink of a quarrel. Every man with whom he was brought into contact tried to provoke him to fight. Only by the most resolute self-control, and by shutting eyes and ears to repeated insults evidently aimed at him, was he enabled to stay through the term without some passage of arms. At the close of the term, he locked up his pistols and bowie-knife in his trunk, ever after attended court unarmed, and never saw the slightest necessity for the use of defensive weapons. He was not prepared to fight, he kept the peace, and no one cared to disturb his peace.

A standing army is to a government what the knife and pistols were to my friend. A government with a large army is in a fighting attitude, invites provocation from other similarly prepared powers, is expected to resent insult even when unintended, to avenge whatever may be construed as wrong, and often to lend itself as a party to quarrels in which it has no direct interest. Its national honor is deemed to be put at hazard, unless it assumes a defiant attitude with every serious misunderstanding between itself and another State. Then, too, as the man who has arms covets the opportunity of testing them, so is a government under strong inducement to try the availableness of its army. The

army itself, also, craves employment. Peace makes promotion too slow for the officers; and they demand to be led toward generalships and marshalships, even though they be brushed repeatedly on their ascending way by the wings of the death-angel. The discipline of the army, too, is relaxed by idleness, and needs, at not unfrequent intervals, to be restored by actual service, so that a government is sometimes very willing to engage in a war just to prevent the demoralization of its troops by an over-long peace. In fine, a nation that has a standing army, will not fail to use it on numerous occasions on which it would not create an army.

Standing armies are, therefore, chargeable with a very large proportion of the war-debt which weighs so heavily upon the European nations, no less than with the enormous current cost of their own support. It is these items which in some countries have swollen taxation almost beyond endurance, besides flooding the channels of trade with an inflated and depreciated currency, which dilutes all prices, depresses every branch of home-industry, and invites in the home-markets the successful competition of countries in a sounder financial condition.

This state of things is the only barrier to the union and progress of Italy at the present moment. A peace-establishment insanely and ruinously large, and the debts contracted in recent wars, make the rate of taxation in the Italian kingdom so oppressive as to check the development of industrial enterprise, to discourage manufactures, and reduce the small proprietors in general to the most meagre and squalid minimum of subsistence, so that the hired laborers, and especially the mendicants, fare better than the poorer owners of the soil. This is the chief cause that prevents the incorporation of the States of the Church with the kingdom of Italy. About one-third of the territory of these States belonging to the Papal Government, and to the various ecclesiastical establishments which it sustains, taxation on the remaining portion of the territory is comparatively light, the rate being but about two-sevenths of that in the Italian kingdom, so that the tax-payers of the Papal States are almost unanimously opposed to the movement by which, but for this obstacle, the whole of Italy would ere this have been united under the sceptre of Victor Emanuel.

The first and most essential step toward the establishment of universal peace is the reduction of standing armies to the mere police-exigencies of the respective kingdoms. Theorists may deny the lawfulness of national, as of individual self-defence; but it is not to be expected that rulers and statesmen will abjure this right. Hence the worth of the lesson derived from our recent experience. We have proved to the world that an unprepared people can meet an exigency of self-defence; that a righteous cause can create forces at need; that a nation compelled to defend itself can at once convert the treasured resources of peace into the sinews of war. May we not, then, hope that the disarmament of the nations which are impoverishing themselves to sustain their places as belligerent powers, will be regarded no longer as a chimera of Utopian dream-

ers, but as the dictate of enlightened self-interest? Treaties among the great powers of Europe for proportionate disarmament, we may hope, will before long be looked upon with favor; and nations, once disarmed, will be slow to give and take insults from one another, to contract wars of ambition or aggression, or to resort to arms for the adjustment of the slightly deranged balance of power. Only a just cause and a strong cause will induce an appeal to the sword; and a vast movement will have been made by the civilized world toward the era foretold in the sure word of prophecy, when nations "shall learn war no more."

CONTEMPORARY WARS.

(1853 — 1866.)

BY M. PAUL LEROY BEAULIEU.

The interest lately awakened in France on the question of Peace and War is already leading to some valuable publications on the subject. Among these is one by M. Beaulieu on *Contemporary Wars*, or those of the last fourteen years in Europe and the United States, not attempting a full view of their rise, progress or general results, but chiefly their "material losses both of money and of men." From a translation of the work in the London *Herald of Peace* we condense the main figures and facts.

A minute exactness is often difficult to attain. There is an abundance of official documents respecting the loss of men; but issued too soon after the war, they are sometimes contradictory and inaccurate. As regards the two great wars in the Crimea and in the United States, and also as to the Schleswig war, we have been enabled to attain complete precision. For these wars have been described in large and comprehensive histories, in which the losses have been studied, enumerated and classified, systematically and scientifically. The official reports of the Crimean war presented to the British Parliament, the remarkable book of Dr. Chenu, the various memorials composing the *Medical and Chirurgical History of the American Rebellion*, the very recent publication by Dr. Læffleur on the *Schleswig Campaign*, are works of scientific exactness. Unfortunately the documents respecting other wars possess neither similar value nor authority.

As regards finances, there is a means of calculating financial losses in vogue with our statesmen, which is to add together the various loans contracted on account of a war, and to take the sum of these different loans for the amount of its expenses. Nothing is more simple, but nothing is less exact. In fact, it often happens that sums of money borrowed in view of a war are only partially expended upon such war; but oftener the sum of the loans is very far from being equivalent to the sum of its expenses. Thus, the expenses of England for the Crimean war were four times greater than the loan which she contracted during that struggle. The only rational means of arriving at moderate precision is to study carefully the war-budgets during the contest, and compare these with those of the preceding period of peace. But there are States which have none, or, rather, had none. Thus the expenses of Russia during the Crimean war will always be difficult to calculate. Certain wars, also, being very recent, we do not possess their complete budgets of expenditure. In some countries it takes a long time to complete them. Even when we get the total expenses of a war to the belligerents, we are still far from knowing all the expenses, even the public ones, which the war has involved. We must also study the budgets of neutral nations; for war in our day has this particular feature, that it strikes a blow at the

finances even of neutral nations, and forces them into an attitude of anxiety, which involves large armaments. Again, in some countries, we must extend our researches still further. Any one who should estimate as the expenses of the Northern States of America during the Secession war only the expense they incurred as members of the Union, without taking account of those incurred by the separate states and districts in their preliminary outlay upon volunteers, and their equipments of every kind, must acknowledge that he has not arrived at the total, and that his estimate would be incomplete. Nor is this all. There are some countries where the initiative efforts of individuals are on a large scale, and where the private contributions towards war are a very important accompaniment of the public expense. The gifts furnished to the Czar by the Russian aristocracy, and all that English and American patriotism so largely contributed as offerings, equipments, or supplies, should also be reckoned. As regards Russia, or England, these private contributions amount to a hundred million francs, and as regards America, to a thousand millions.

But is even this all? By no means. All the private losses, the ravage of the lands, the spoiling of crops; in case of siege or maritime war, the ruin of cities, and the destruction of shipping, — all these losses, impossible to be estimated, must be always kept in view, although they cannot be calculated. Nor is even this all; for by the side of these losses, we must take account of the losses involved in the stagnation of business, the dulness of commerce, and the stoppage of industry. All these ruinous effects, which the curse of war accumulates, escape our statistics; but they are not the least part of that curse.

CRIMEAN WAR.

Loss of Life. — The Crimean war is the most murderous of recent European wars. In estimating its loss of men, we shall chiefly take for our guide the report of Dr. Chenu. This valuable document possesses the double merit of being official and scientific; it emanates, in fact, from the Ministry of War, and it obtained from the Academy of Sciences the grand prize for Statistics.

The French army had to struggle against three great dangers — the cholera, the enemy's fire, and the scurvy. In the month of September, 1854, our army had not yet seen the enemy; but it had already lost 8,084 men, chiefly through cholera. Throughout the campaign disease carried off four times as many victims as the Russian fire. Ambulances in the Crimea and hospitals at Constantinople and elsewhere received 436,144 attacked by cholera and various other diseases, while 80,590 more reported killed or dead, and 15,025 on their return to France died of wounds or diseases during the war.

From these figures we can calculate the proportion of lives lost. The troops sent by France at different times amounted to 309,268, and hence the losses were nearly one-third of the whole. Only 10,240 are said to have been killed by the enemy; a number nearly one-third larger sank under their wounds; and this leaves 75,000 who died of cholera, scurvy and other diseases. During the first four months, the cholera carried off 8,084 men; and M. Jacquot attributes to scurvy one-third of the total loss. The 20,000 men who died on the field of battle, or in consequence of their wounds, had at least obtained a speedy death; but these 75,000 victims of cholera, typhus, and hospital corruption, were obliged to undergo all the delays, sufferings and miseries of a death of unmitigated horror.

If 95,615 Frenchmen were carried off by death, are we to believe this was the limit of our losses? Are we to believe that the 214,000 soldiers who escaped death in this disastrous expedition, returned to France in the same con-